Files
team-tryouts/tests/test_audit_logging.py
T
GGThedandClaude Opus 5 835a394d3f fix(auth): enumeration, verrou, deconnexion en GET, redirection ouverte
Quatre constats de la liste des gains rapides, tous sur auth.py.

SEC-017 -- enumeration de comptes
Le formulaire repondait "il vous reste 3 tentative(s)" a un compte connu et
"verifiez le nom d utilisateur et le mot de passe" a un inconnu. Le decompte
lui-meme etait la fuite : la meme information, etalee sur cinq requetes.
S y ajoutait un ecart de temps de reponse, check_password n etant appele que
si la ligne existait -- scrypt est cher, l ecart est mesurable.

Un seul message pour tous les echecs, et la verification s execute
desormais sur les deux branches : contre un hachage aleatoire tire une fois
par processus quand l identifiant n existe pas.

SEC-018 -- verrou de compte declenchable par un tiers
Cinq mauvaises reponses mettaient un compte connu hors service pendant
quinze minutes, indefiniment renouvelables. Sur un compte president, c est
toute l administration, et aucun ecran ne permettait de defaire.

Le compteur et la fenetre restent -- ce sont la trace qu un administrateur
lit quand un compte est pilonne, et la fenetre double jusqu a un plafond.
Ce qui change : de bons identifiants passent, fenetre ouverte ou non, et
remettent le compteur a zero. Le proprietaire du compte ne peut plus etre
bloque par un tiers.

Ce que cela coute, dit franchement : un verrou dur n arretait de toute
facon pas un attaquant ayant trouve le mot de passe -- il lui suffisait
d attendre. Le debit de tentatives reste borne par la limite de 10/minute
par IP. Une limite par couple (compte, IP) demanderait un stockage dedie ;
elle attend Alembic.

L evenement account.locked devient account.throttled : "locked" affirmait
plus que ce qui se passe.

SEC-019 -- deconnexion en GET
/auth/logout n avait pas de methods, donc GET, donc hors protection CSRF :
n importe quelle page pouvait deconnecter un visiteur avec une balise img.
La route passe en POST et l entree de navigation devient un formulaire avec
jeton. Le style suit -- les regles .nav-links visaient les liens seuls.

SEC-020 -- validation de redirection
is_safe_url interrogeait urlparse().netloc. urlparse lit /\evil.com comme
un chemin, sans netloc ; plusieurs navigateurs normalisent l antislash en
barre oblique avant de resoudre, ce qui en fait //evil.com. La fonction
refuse maintenant antislash et caracteres de controle, exige un chemin
enracine, et compare l origine explicitement.

Le xfail(strict) qui documentait SEC-017 est leve. 40 tests dans
test_auth_session.py, dont la table des cibles refusees.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-08 15:05:13 -04:00

203 lines
7.0 KiB
Python

"""Security event logging.
OBS-001. logging_config.py configured a rotating auth.log handler, a named
'team_tryouts.auth' logger and a redaction filter — and get_auth_logger was
never imported anywhere. The file was created and stayed empty: no login,
no failure, no lockout, no role change, no deletion left a trace. After a
suspected compromise there was nothing to look at.
"""
import logging
import pytest
from app.extensions import db
from app.models import User
@pytest.fixture
def auth_log(caplog):
"""Capture records emitted on the auth logger.
The logger sets propagate = False so its records never reach the root
handler caplog installs; the handler is attached directly instead.
"""
logger = logging.getLogger('team_tryouts.auth')
previous = logger.level
logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
logger.addHandler(caplog.handler)
try:
yield caplog
finally:
logger.removeHandler(caplog.handler)
logger.setLevel(previous)
def _events(caplog):
return [r.getMessage() for r in caplog.records]
def _has_event(caplog, name):
return any(f'event={name}' in message for message in _events(caplog))
class TestLoginEvents:
def test_a_successful_login_is_recorded(self, client, as_role, auth_log):
as_role('player')
assert _has_event(auth_log, 'login.success')
def test_the_record_carries_who_and_from_where(self, app, client, as_role, auth_log):
user_id = as_role('coach')
with app.app_context():
username = db.session.get(User, user_id).username
message = next(m for m in _events(auth_log) if 'event=login.success' in m)
assert f'username={username}' in message
assert f'user_id={user_id}' in message
assert 'role=coach' in message
assert 'ip=' in message
def test_a_wrong_password_is_recorded(self, app, client, make_user, login, auth_log):
user_id = make_user('player')
with app.app_context():
username = db.session.get(User, user_id).username
login(username, password='WrongPassword1')
assert _has_event(auth_log, 'login.failure')
def test_an_unknown_username_is_recorded_separately(self, client, login, auth_log):
login('no-such-account', password='WrongPassword1')
assert _has_event(auth_log, 'login.failure.unknown_user')
def test_a_run_of_failures_is_recorded(self, app, client, make_user, login, auth_log):
"""Renamed from account.locked with SEC-018: the window no longer
refuses the account owner, so 'locked' overstated what happened."""
user_id = make_user('player')
with app.app_context():
username = db.session.get(User, user_id).username
for _ in range(5):
login(username, password='WrongPassword1')
assert _has_event(auth_log, 'account.throttled')
def test_a_deactivated_account_attempt_is_recorded(
self, app, client, make_user, login, auth_log
):
user_id = make_user('player')
with app.app_context():
user = db.session.get(User, user_id)
user.is_active_account = False
username = user.username
db.session.commit()
login(username)
assert _has_event(auth_log, 'login.rejected.deactivated')
def test_logout_is_recorded(self, client, as_role, auth_log):
as_role('player')
client.post('/auth/logout')
assert _has_event(auth_log, 'logout')
class TestAdministrativeEvents:
def test_account_creation_is_recorded(self, client, as_role, auth_log):
as_role('admin')
client.post('/users/create', data={
'username': 'newcoach', 'email': '[email protected]',
'password': 'Password123', 'full_name': 'New Coach', 'role': 'coach',
}, follow_redirects=True)
assert _has_event(auth_log, 'account.created_by_admin')
def test_a_role_change_records_both_roles(self, app, client, as_role, make_user, auth_log):
target_id = make_user('player')
as_role('admin')
client.post(f'/users/{target_id}/edit', data={
'full_name': 'Promoted', 'email': '[email protected]',
'role': 'coach', 'is_active_account': 'on',
}, follow_redirects=True)
message = next(m for m in _events(auth_log) if 'event=account.role_changed' in m)
assert 'previous_role=player' in message
assert 'new_role=coach' in message
assert f'target_id={target_id}' in message
def test_account_deletion_is_recorded(self, client, as_role, make_user, auth_log):
victim_id = make_user('player')
as_role('admin')
client.post(f'/users/{victim_id}/delete', follow_redirects=True)
assert _has_event(auth_log, 'account.deleted')
def test_a_self_service_password_change_is_recorded(
self, app, client, as_role, auth_log
):
user_id = as_role('player')
with app.app_context():
username = db.session.get(User, user_id).username
client.post('/users/profile/edit', data={
'username': username, 'full_name': 'Same Name',
'email': '[email protected]', 'password': 'BrandNew123',
}, follow_redirects=True)
assert _has_event(auth_log, 'account.password_changed')
class TestRedaction:
"""The filter is a security control; it needs its own test.
It used to inspect record.msg only, while every call site logs with %s
placeholders — so the sensitive value sat in record.args and was never
examined.
"""
def test_a_secret_passed_through_args_is_redacted(self):
from app.logging_config import SensitiveDataFilter
record = logging.LogRecord(
'test', logging.ERROR, 'x.py', 1,
'Database failure: %s', ('password=hunter2 host=db.internal',), None,
)
SensitiveDataFilter().filter(record)
rendered = record.getMessage()
assert 'hunter2' not in rendered
assert '[REDACTED]' in rendered
def test_a_bearer_token_is_redacted(self):
from app.logging_config import SensitiveDataFilter
record = logging.LogRecord(
'test', logging.INFO, 'x.py', 1,
'Calling Discord with %s', ('Bearer abcdef123456',), None,
)
SensitiveDataFilter().filter(record)
assert 'abcdef123456' not in record.getMessage()
def test_an_ordinary_message_is_left_alone(self):
from app.logging_config import SensitiveDataFilter
record = logging.LogRecord(
'test', logging.INFO, 'x.py', 1,
'event=login.success username=%s', ('alice',), None,
)
SensitiveDataFilter().filter(record)
assert record.getMessage() == 'event=login.success username=alice'
def test_a_malformed_format_string_does_not_drop_the_record(self):
from app.logging_config import SensitiveDataFilter
record = logging.LogRecord(
'test', logging.INFO, 'x.py', 1, 'broken %d', ('not-a-number',), None,
)
assert SensitiveDataFilter().filter(record) is True